As políticas de estímulos econômicos e a "democratização" do setor agropecuário

Abstract This essay deals with the fact that there has been a lack of historic I determination in the studies and propositions of economic policies in so far as Specific Social Formations are concerned, as well as kinds of country markets with similar social formation. Farming and cattle raising in the Latin American capitalism - here considers as a structure of prevailing market - is a discriminated oligopoly of several average and small enterprises that prefer profusion value to the land constitution of rural estates. This is however, considered a n insufficient criterion because it points out a judicial and legal relation which enables but does not determine the social relations of production. The economic agents are here classified into five big categories: marginal, normal, average differentiated, large differentiated and leading producers with their respective macro economic functions. The incidence of economic policies that incentivate production, without considering market formation and degree of oligopoly - in opposition to what is desired - induces and stimulates economic concentration by enlarging profit limits of differentiated producers, especially by using policies concerning indiscriminating prices. The relative independent of credit that differentiated enterprises make use of, due to high possibilities of debts, permits the usage of selective credit and, at the same time, gives them guidance as far as growth of productive capital is concerned. The report shows that the production value per rural property is directly proportional to the incorporated productive capital, while the production value per hectare is the result of the total capital (Land capital or the value of bare land plus productive capital). This element will be added to the examination of credit policies and it will, at the same time, help explain why the dispossession of large unproductive landed estates does not always mean a decentralization of economic power. Since the production value per rural estate depends on the productive capital at hand, one is not overtaken by the fact that the economic incineration surpasses the landed property concentration. What actually surprises is the relatively low concentration of landed property. The essay intends to explain - in opposition to the usual approach - the concentration of landed property starting with the concentration of economic power, differentiated profits and high level concentration of both generated and privately acquired surplus. The concentration of landed property is not proportional to the economic concentration because of farming ''resistances'' which allow the use of alternative productive means of low-level capitalization; therefore, the producer conveys to less aggressive markets or withdraws to self-running business. Furthermore, the family-type work force which is, at the me time cost - because of consumption of human muscular energy, are source of gains – due to the generation of sales surplus, supports the structure of familiar producers. Modernization of farming, especially of family units, introduces both a disturbing and concentrating element because it implies specialization and enhancement of intersectional exchanges which causes increase in the peasants' money expenses. This fact is responsible for additional debts and costs since the peasants are obliged to buy the food formerly self-produce. Summarizing, the policies of economic incentives and modernization, without considering productive structure, stimulate economic concentration which determines the marginality and proletarianism of peasants